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THE MORALITY OF GROUPS: COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY, GROUP-BASED HARM, AND CORPORATE RIGHTS. By Larry May.t Notre Dame, Indiana:
University of Notre Dame Press. 1987. Pp. xii, 200. $23.95.
Michael Levin 2
Well before finishing The Morality of Groups-well before
opening it, in fact-I predicted to myself from the title alone that
Professor Larry May would reach the following conclusions:
I.
2.

3.

4.
5.

Groups do not exactly exist but they do not exactly not exist.
Groups exist enough to be harmed, with sex stereotyping the paradigmatic example of such harm.
By the same token, groups exist enough to justify group-based compensation
for disadvantaged groups (paradigmatically blacks and women) even when this
overrides individual rights.
Groups also exist enough to render organizations liable for the misdeeds of a
few of their officers.
On the other hand, groups don't exist enough to create immuniti~s for profitseeking organizations.

Imagine my satisfaction, then, when my reading confirmed
that Professor May holds every one of these positions. Not that I
was perfectly prescient: I failed to anticipate his defense of publicly
funded class-action litigation, or his advocacy of special rights and
immunities for the NAACP when this conflicts with the free speech
of "racist individuals." Still, my success raises a question: how did
I know so much?
There are two hypotheses that may explain the data. First,
perhaps all five positions are self-evident, so that May, being a competent philosopher, could be trusted to arrive at them. Alternatively, perhaps May, like many "applied ethicists" in academe, is
committed a priori to preferences for blacks and women, and dislikes business, so the only uncertainty is the manner in which he
will try to justify his commitments.
How is one to decide between these two hypotheses? The first
hypothesis predicts that May's arguments will be so overwhelming
as to make a reader wonder why anyone remains attached to individualistic justice. If, on the other hand, May's arguments are post
hoc justifications for conclusions reached beforehand, these arguments may be expected to be weak and unconvincing; our second
hypothesis predicts that May will skate over difficulties with unI. Associate Professor of Philosophy, Purdue University.
2. Professor of Philosophy. City College of New York and the Graduate Center of the
City University of New York.
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seemly haste, equivocate at crucial junctures, avert his gaze from
logical muddle, and avoid inconvenient facts. This, I regret to say,
is the hypothesis supported by most of the evidence in The Morality
of Groups.
May realizes that the moral status of groups awaits a determination of their ontological status. Groups cannot act, suffer, or deserve recompense unless they exist. Indeed, the most cogent
objection to "group rights" and "group debts" has always been
skepticism on this point of ontology. Social reality, for the "methodological individualist," consists of interrelated individuals; talk of
groups is a convenient fiction not to be taken literally at the level of
serious causal or moral analysis. There's nobody here but us people. Although moral ascriptions depend heavily on the relations
people bear to each other, it is to individuals alone that these ascriptions ultimately apply. I cannot owe my grocer money unless I
have a grocer, but it is still I, not the dyad composed of the grocer
and myself, who carry the debt. This spare ontology, continues the
individualist, is also the more morally enlightened. Reification of
groups in earlier times led individuals to be treated on the basis of
the groups to which they belonged rather than their own merits.
Because in fact there are no groups, this reification required in effect
that people be judged for the actions of others to whom they might
be quite adventitiously related. It is somewhat disturbing that May
wishes to demonstrate the existence of groups precisely to get us to
"reconsider ... these moral conceptions [of] Germanic tribal and
feudal societies."
A group is an entity over and above its constituent individuals,
says May, if (and only if) the putative properties of the group are
more than mere sums of the properties of its constituents. As a
special case of this criterion, a group exists if there are properties of
its members that can be explained only by reference to membership
in the group itself. In May's words, social groups must be recognized because a phenomenon like group solidarity "is not itself
merely a function of the individual psychological states of the members of the group." This, in turn, means that
group members aid one another in significant ways and thereby enable one another
to act differently than they could act on their own .... The capacities of individuals
change when they are mixed together with other individuals. This change is best
captured, it seems to me, by reference to the structure of the group.

Because groups exist insofar as individuals in groups act, think, and
suffer in ways they would not by themselves, May defines groups to
be "individuals in relationships." It is not so much groups as relations among individuals which have "a distinct ontological status
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which is different from the individuals related." By shifting the
ontological burden to relations, May arrives at "a middle position,
one in which it is possible to give both a qualified 'yes' and a qualified 'no' to the question: 'Do social groups exist?' " In other words,
they don't exactly exist and they don't exactly not exist.
May uses his criterion not only to demonstrate the existence of
mobs, corporations, and oppressed groups (more or less equated
with blacks and females), but also to identify the modes of group
agency. Groups intend and act (and bear responsibility) because
the intentions and actions of each member reflect the intentions and
actions of other members, with corporations acting "vicariously"
through their officers. Groups like women and South African
blacks can be harmed because injury to each member is transmitted,
according to May, to every other member via their physical resemblance: "An additive, or cumulative, account of the pervasiveness
of sexual discrimination does not give adequate emphasis to the
links between the various harms inflicted upon individual women."
To explain how woman A, not "directly" touched by discrimination
against woman B or any other woman, may nonetheless be said to
be harmed, he reasons that Ms. A would have suffered discrimination had she been in Ms. B 's position. (By the same token, I suppose, a flowerpot falling on Mr. X indirectly harms me because it
would have brained me had I been standing where Mr. X was, and a
university that hires me must indirectly benefit all similarly qualified philosophers who would have been hired had they applied for
the job I received.) The beneficiary of group harm to women is, of
course, "the group 'men.' "
May relies on his criterion even when seemingly arbitrarily
changing his mind about which groups exist. Thus, after having
argued that corporations can intend, act, and incur liability because
"the corporate decision-making structure" is needed to explain the
behavior of corporate officers, he maintains that corporations have
no interests (and thus greatly reduced rights claims) because
the corporation's interests in realizing its goals [are] merely a summation of the
interests of the current and perhaps past, employees, managers, and stockhold·
ers .... [T]he corporation's interests [are] a mere aggregation of the interests of its
members.

May is able to play so fast and loose because the old conundrum, "Is the whole greater than the sum of its parts?," and consequently May's position on it, is in fact hopelessly confused.
Whether a property of a whole is or is not the sum of the properties
of its parts depends upon what is to count as a property of a part
and how part-properties are to be added. Water, unlike hydrogen
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or oxygen, is a liquid at one hundred degrees Fahrenheit. If the
properties of hydrogen and oxygen are limited to their atomic
weights, atomic numbers, and physical states at one hundred degrees Fahrenheit, the properties of water are irreducible to those of
hydrogen and oxygen. But if "combines with oxygen to form a liquid at one hundred degrees Fahrenheit" is taken as a property of
hydrogen, the liquidity of water is explained by the properties of its
components. And it is surely arbitrary to include the atomic weight
of hydrogen among its "individual states" while excluding its tendency to form a liquid with hydrogen. The reference to oxygen in
the description of hydrogen's combining properties is consistent
with those combining properties being "individual states," for a hydrogen molecule in splendid isolation, miles from any oxygen, is
still disposed to combine with oxygen. Indeed, all the world's oxygen is presently disposed to react in definite ways to transuranium
elements that may never exist. The "intrinsic" gaseousness of hydrogen at one hundred degrees Fahrenheit, for its part, is specified
by reference to the Fahrenheit scale, and perhaps to Herr Fahrenheit himself.
The border surrounding "individual" states is even less clear
when the states in question are psychological. Robinson Crusoe
would doubtless have enjoyed a different outlook on life had he
found his island already occupied by a contingent from Club Med,
but this shows the irreducibility of group psychology to individual
psychology only if "individual psychological states" are those that
are not caused by other individuals. May in fact flirts with such a
definition in his final pages without realizing that it would trivialize
his overall thesis. All familiar human conduct becomes "groupbased" if the only "individual" statues are those belonging to orphans raised on desert islands, in which case "individual" and
"group-based" marks no distinction within ordinary moral experience. Or consider May's gloss on the Watts rioters:
The intentions displayed by such social groups ... [such as] beating white motorists, and overturning cars and setting fire to them ... may be treated as if they were
collective, since they arise out of the relations and structures of the group. . . . [T]he
intentions and goals of some or most of the mob members are different from their
intentions and goals as individuals. And while the change in their intentions is still
a change in their individual intentions, it is the group structure that has brought
about this change .... [E]ach member of the group comes to have the same intention, either reflectively or pre-reflectively, and this is different from what their individual intentions would be if they were not members of the group. The sameness of
intention is collective in the sense that it is caused by the group structure, that is, it
is group based3
3.

May's source for his description of the Watts riots is M. BROWN & A. GOLDIN,
(1973). He cites without demur their assessment of the riots as a

COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR

1989]

BOOK REVIEWS

527

Now, while no rioter would have formed the intention of attacking
white motorists absent other rampaging blacks, each rioter taken
singly was already disposed to attack white motorists if accompanied by other rampaging blacks. This prior disposition, whose
existence is shown by its subsequent manifestations and whose
physical basis is no doubt some currently unknown state of the nervous system, is surely an "individual psychological state." Each individual rioter's intention to attack white motorists can therefore be
explained with equal cogency as the action of other individuals on
his individual psychology. The reference to group structure becomes superfluous.
My point is not the superiority of individualistic to group explanations, but the arbitrariness of classifying explanations as one
or the other. There can be no fixed criterion for group action or
group existence until "property of an individual" is adequately
specified. Apparently unfamiliar with the technical literature on
this problem,4 and certainly not concerned to offer a consistent definition of his own, May is free to construe "individual state" as suits
his convenience. Even though the interests of corporate officers reflect their corporate positions just as surely as the interests of blacks
reflect their membership in the NAACP, May counts the heightened salience of each member of the NAACP as a group effect but
the interests of corporate officers as "individually separate." It is
then an easy step for him to grant to the NAACP a package of first
amendment rights he has denied to corporations. (To be sure, May
also enlists the logically irrelevant contention that the NAACP
serves more socially desirable interests than does a corporation.)
This is what I mean by averting one's gaze from logical muddle.
But suppose these criticisms are wrong. Suppose there are
non-arbitrary criteria according to which groups exist and display
moral properties. What follows? Should groups possess constitutional rights? If so, when are those rights weightier than individual
rights? Here The Morality of Groups will disappoint readers, especially legal readers accustomed to analyses constructed to vindicate
one side or the other of concrete disputes. For the most part May
response to ··an assault on a vulnerable and helpless community by a powerful representative
of white colonial interests'' (i.e., the police). To judge by May's citations, every riotous act
was provoked by police misbehavior.
4. The relativity of reduction to choice of part-properties and modes of aggregation
was emphasized as long ago as 1942 by Henle, The Status of Emergence, 391. OF PHIL 486
(1942); see a/so C. HEMPEL, ASPECTS OF SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION 260-62 (1965); E.
NAGEL, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENCE ch. II ( 1961). In M. LEVIN, METAPHYSICS AND THE
MIND-BODY PROBLEM ( 1979), I suggest that a property of a whole is intuitively reducible to
properties of its parts when both whole and part-properties are among continuum-many determinations of the same determinable; other authors have made related suggestions.
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avoids definitive judgments altogether, being content to reiterate unhelpfully that groups "should be recognized as having at least some
form of standing to make legitimate moral or legal claims." Indeed,
upon reviewing the one problem May considers in detail, and extending his account to a sample of issues left undiscussed, it becomes clear that group rights have not been shown to play any role
whatever in legal reasoning. In any case, May's failure to test his
theory in a variety of cases is a major weakness of his book.
May considers the dilemma of a Legal Services Corporation
lawyer who must choose between taking a divorce case and a challenge to a power company's policy of shutoff upon nonpayment.
The first case affects the prospective client only, whereas the second
case reaches beyond the prospective client to other members of his
group, namely everyone sufficiently in arrears on his gas bill. The
LSC lawyer, contends May, is clearly permitted to choose to litigate
the shutoff case if winning it will secure the rights of many people.
According to May, an individualist-by contrast-would treat each
individual petitioner as equally entitled to the LSC's attention. Notice, however, that May's argument-whatever the merits of its
conclusion-does not oppose the rights of the individual divorceseeker to any group right; it opposes the rights of the individual
divorce-seeker (to access to the LSC and thence the divorce courts)
to the aggregated rights of many individual subscribers to the power
company. For May, as for a commonsensical individualist, the
choice is made after balancing the rights and interests of individuals.
Or consider affirmative action, a topic close to the heart of
May's position but one on which he is curiously silent. According
to group rights theory, does the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment require State U. to favor black applicants to its
law school as compensation for past injury? Offhand, the answer
would seem to be an unequivocal "yes," especially if it is granted
that the group blacks have indeed been injured. Because blacks as a
group were injured, every black has a claim against ... whom?
Blacks as a group have a claim against whites as a group-a claim
against every white-only if every white benefitted from those injuries, a proposition which is by no means self-evident. It certainly
cannot be assumed that all blacks have suffered and all whites have
benefitted to precisely the same extent: justice in the law school
case depends on the precise harm to the particular black applicants
and the precise gains wrongfully accrued by their particular white
competitors-a determination which cannot be made simply by
chanting the "group rights" mantra. Recall, furthermore, that ac-
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cording to May, group harm creates "some form of standing to
make a legitimate legal claim," not an indefeasible entitlement; the
vagueness of May's formulation allows the harm done to qualified
whites to counterbalance the blacks' claims to compensation, and
the harm to society of abandoning merit standards to offset what
may (or may not) be the demands of justice. In short, recognition
of group rights does nothing to meet any of the familiar objections
to affirmative action. If these objections are inadequate, it is not
because they are overwhelmed by "group rights."
Finally, does the group vulnerability of women warrant constitutional protection of their "equality of rights under the law," as the
Equal Rights Amendment promises? Well, whether all women are
vulnerable just by virtue of their womanhood is an empirical issue
which the concept of group rights is incapable of addressing, however much its language may suggest a positive answer. Even assuming a prima facie case for the ERA based upon the group concept, a
host of other familiar questions remain: would the ERA require
conscripting women for combat if men are conscripted? Would it
eliminate tax exemptions for churches that do not ordain women?
If the answers are "yes," would the ERA inflict too much damage
on the social fabric? If the answer is "the courts will decide," is it a
good idea to give the judiciary this kind of authority? The group
rights perspective adds nothing to our understanding of these
questions.
May delivers so much less than he promises because he, like
everyone else, must in the end base all ascriptions of intent, harm,
fault, and desert on the ascription of these categories to individuals.
As our discussions of equal access, affirmative action, and the ERA
suggest, raising moral issues in group terms is a gigantic distraction,
a mug's game. It is all very well to hold "Yale University" responsible for sexual harassment, as May does,s but individuals-employees, managers, directors, CEOs, shareholders, trustees, blacks and
whites, males and females-remain the malefactors and benefi5. Here is sexual harassment as May imagines it: "Professor Smith calls in one of his
graduate students, Ms. Jones, and says Td like you to sleep with me. If you won't. I'll make
sure you lose your assistantship.' . . . Assume that in this instance, Professor Smith had
threatened graduate students before, and word of this travelled to the Chairman, the Dean,
and the Vice President, yet they had said nothing to Professor Smith or to any of his graduate
students." To begin with, it is extremely unlikely that Smith's superiors would take no action
in the circumstance described. Well before the concept of "sexual harassment" was invented,
such conduct would have been severely penalized, and some professors were reprimanded
merely for asking a student for a date. More telling is May's apparent unfamiliarity with the
dynamics of desire. Flat-footed declarations of lust simply don't happen. A real "Professor
Smith" would at least try to be a little more seductive, and his excitement would be likely to
abate if unreciprocated. Improper advances occur, but the truth is more nuanced than May
seems to recognize.
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ciaries, the ultimate winners and losers of all such judgments. Logically, May's position is compatible with any canon of judgment,
including conventional ones; it merely reformulates these canons
and their attendant problems in more obscure language. For instance, a corporation turns out to be "vicariously negligent" if "appropriate members of the corporation failed to take preventive
measures" they could have "reasonably" foreseen to be necessary.
(May seems to favor sanctions against the "appropriate members of
the corporation" when corporations are liable.) This again tells us
nothing new. The main problem in negligence theory is the difficult
concept of reasonableness, and a detour through "vicarious" negligence leaves us no better able to assess reasonableness in concrete
cases than we were before.
It is here that the tendentiousness of group language gives it
the appearance of content. Group-think does yield moral novelty
via novel theories of fact. By exaggerating the cohesiveness of select
groups it makes a showing of harm (selectively) easier and defenses
against fault (selectively) more difficult. This slide from groupthink into fiction is well illustrated by May's long (4500-word) account of sex stereotypes. May certainly does his cause little good by
selecting the socialization of women as the most salient example he
can think of a "high standing group-based wrong" in a world in
which mass slaughters are appallingly frequent. He is also quite
wrong in maintaining that women exhibit the "three plausible interrelationships" that, according to him, facilitate group harm, namely
"shared group consciousness, confined primary relationships, and
distinctive cultural heritage." May has fallen into the trap of thinking of women as a cohesive minority.
What, in any case, is wrong with stereotypic generalizations
about, say, women and blacks? May condemns stereotypes partly
because they lead the members of stereotyped groups to be "treated
as if they had no individuality, as if there were no salient differences
among members of the group." Of course, this is not literally true;
despite extant stereotypes about black criminality, a black jaywalker
is treated more leniently than a black murderer. What May seems
to mean is that stereotypes are bad because they are "unjust" to
their exceptions. And this is where May fails to make some crucial
distinctions. In discussing stereotypes, the first question is whether
(and in what sense) the stereotype is true as a generalization. If it is,
then it's ridiculous to deplore the stereotype as a thought (that takes
due account of exceptions) though it may (or may not, depending
on the circumstances) be appropriate to deplore social behavior
based on the assumption that a given individual will or may con-
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form to the stereotype in a given situation. The stereotype that
blacks are disproportionately likely to be criminals is true. Nevertheless, to incarcerate Jesse Jackson without a trial, because he is
black, would be improper. If, however, the question is whether a
driver should discriminate between young black hitchhikers in casual clothes and elderly white hitchhikers in three-piece suits, the
answer may be different and is certainly more problematic.
Most stereotypes, including all those cited by May, are true at
the observational level. All the great scientific geniuses have been
men, as have the overwhelming majority of ordinary scientists and
engineers. In this sense, the stereotype about the male's greater
originality and abstract rationality is empirically warranted, as are
the stereotypes about the male's greater aggressiveness (war and violent crime are practically a male monopoly), black rhythm (blacks
invented rhythm 'n' blues, jazz, and rap music), and Jewish cleverness (ever notice the number of Jewish lawyers?). Not all Jews are
clever, of course, yet Jews are disproportionately represented in the
law, and that is what the stereotype correctly captures. It should
also be noted that stereotypes may depart from literal truth by implying an evaluation of the stereotyped trait. Thus, May characterizes the conventional belief about Jews as the stereotype that they
are "cunning." Once it is recognized that "cunning" is a name bestowed on such cleverness as the speaker dislikes, it again becomes
clear that the factual core of this stereotype is correct, however
much one may properly object to the pejorative innuendo of "cunning." Whether the presence of a stereotypic trait is relevant to
how one should treat a particular individual in a particular situation
is of course a different question, and no doubt stereotypes (true and
false) can be misused-but caution in their use should not require
us to deny evident facts.
Critics of stereotyping usually don't confine themselves to such
banal, commonsensical observations as the need for caution. For
example, some critics admit the truth of stereotypes but assert that
they are true only because they are believed, mere self-fulfilling
prophecies which stunt individual development. This approach is
vulnerable to scientific findings, which often prove or strongly suggest that group traits are primarily biological, not social, in origin.
On the one hand, the failure of women to enter the legal profession
in large numbers before the 1970s was clearly due to social rather
than biological causes (although calling a cause "social" does not
necessarily make it discriminatory or oppressive). On the other
hand, male aggressiveness is produced by the action of hormones on
the fetal brain, not primarily by the viewing of Clint Eastwood mov-
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ies. 6 Boys still regularly outscore girls on tests of mathematical
ability and other indicators of abstract reasoning ability, even
though textbooks now go to great lengths to cast women in traditional male roles. 7 The verbal IQ of Jews of European ancestry is
one hundred thirteen, the highest of any known ethnic group.s
Granted, biological differences are sometimes reinforced by social
conditioning. Still, the list of exploded social-origin theories is very
long.
At several points, May grasps the much more precarious horn
of the dilemma; rather than attributing the truth of stereotypes to
social causes, he claims that stereotypes are simply false. He writes:
"Stereotyping of a group of persons occurs when a model or type is
created from a composite of the characteristics of a few group members." The generalization, in other words, is invalid even if taken as
a generalization. At other times, he hedges his denial with impenetrable echelons of qualifiers, as when he describes women as vulnerable to stereotyping because "[t]he members of this group are
defined as having certain characteristics which many, if not most, of
the individuals may not have," and despairs that "it is very difficult
to convince people on an intellectual level, on the level of statistics
and data, that they have generalized incorrectly." Given the empirical reliability of the central sex stereotypes, and their validation by
science, the reader is entitled to at least one example of these "statistics and data." May provides none. He simply insinuates stereotypes away, and with them a vast body of research inconsistent with
the empirical foundations of his view of society. This is what I
meant by a half-conscious avoidance of inconvenient facts.9
There is no question that belief in group rights informs current
public policy. Some such theory is necessary to confer the appearance of sense on penalties for individually innocent white males and
benefits to individually undamaged blacks and women. It is cause
for reflection that, in less than three decades, the quest for civil
rights has led us back to feudal Germany.
6. See Erhardt & Meyer-Biauberg, Effects of Prenatal Hormones on Gender-Related
Behavior, 211 SCIENCE 1312 (1984).
7. See Benbow & Stanley, Sex Differences in Mathematical Ability: Fact or Amfact?,
210 SciENCE 1262 (1980).
8. See Gordon & Rudert, Bad News Concerning IQ Tests, 52 Soc. OF Eouc. 174
(1979).
9. May does not even go through the motions of denying the empirical validity of
stereotypes about blacks, simply passing over the question in silence.

